## **MIZHO**

WEEK AHEAD

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Mizuho Bank, Ltd. Asia and Oceania Treasury Department

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Economic Calendar						<ul> <li>Survey results from Bloomberg, as of 18 Jun 2021; The lists are not exhaustive and only meant to highlight key data/events.</li> </ul>					
<u>G3</u>						Asia					
Date	Country	Event	Period	Survey*	Prior	Date	Country	Event	Period	Survey*	Prior
21 Jun	US	Chicago Fed Nat Activity Index	May	0.88	0.24	21-Jun	СН	5-Year/1-Yr Loan Prime Rate	21-Jun	4.65%/3.85%	4.65%3.85%
							AU	Retail Sales MoM	May P	0.50%	1.1%
22 Jun	US	Existing Home Sales	May	5.71m	5.85m						
	US	Richmond Fed Manufact. Index	Jun	18.0	18.0	22-Jun	KR	PPI YoY	May		5.6%
	EZ	Consumer Confidence	Jun A		-5.1						
	JP	Machine Tool Orders YoY	May F		140.7%	23-Jun	TH	Customs Exports/Imports YoY	May	33.5%/53.4%	13.1%/29.8%
							TH	Customs Trade Balance	May	\$1038m	\$182m
23 Jun	US	New Home Sales	May	882k	863k		SG	CPI YoY/Core CPI YoY	Мау	2.2%/0.7%	2.1%/0.6%
	US	Current Account Balance	1Q	-\$207.1b	-\$188.5b		TH	BoT Benchmark Interest Rate	23-Jun	0.50%	0.50%
	EZ	Markit Eurozone Manufacturing/Services PMI	Jun P		63.1/55.2						
	JP	Leading Index CI/Coincident Index	Apr F		103/95.5	24-Jun	PH	BSP Overnight Borrowing Rate	23-Jun	2.00%	2.00%
	JP	Jibun Bank Japan PMI Mfg/Services	Jun P		53/46.5						
	JP	BOJ Minutes of April Meeting				25-Jun	KR	Business Survey Manuf./Non-Manuf.	Jul		97/81
							MY	CPI YoY	May	4.7%	4.7%
24 Jun	US	Initial Jobless Claims	19-Jun				SG	Industrial Production YoY	May	24.2%	2.1%
	US	Kansas City Fed Manf. Activity	Jun		26		CH	BoP Current Account Balance	1Q F		\$75.1b
	US	GDP Annualized QoQ	1Q T	6.4%	6.4%						
	US	Durables Ex Transportation	May P	0.7%	1.0%	25-30 Jun	VN	GDP YoY	2Q		4.5%
	US	Wholesale Inventories MoM	May P		0.8%		VN	CPI YoY	Jun		2.9%
	US	Durable Goods Orders	May P	3.0%	-1.3%		VN	Retail Sales YTD YoY	Jun		7.6%
_	GE	IFO Expectations/Business Climate	Jun		102.9/99.2		VN	Industrial Production YoY	Jun		11.6%
_						Vietnam:	Q2 GDP gro	wth to be hit by the ongoing virus ou	tbreak		
25 Jun	US	U. of Mich. Sentiment	Jun F	86.8	86.4			job at containing the pandemic in 2020, N			ently faced
	US	PCE Core Deflator YoY/MoM	May	/0.6%	3.1%/0.7%			s than at another point during the pane			
	US	Personal Spending/Personal Income	May	0.3%/-2.9%	0.5%/-13.1%			in COVID-19 cases, especially of new m			

Week-in-brief: Reining in (Run-away) Hawks?

Week-in-brief: Reining in (Run-away) Hawks? - After last week's FOMC, the question is not whether market perceptions of hawkishness have gotten ahead of the FOMC intent; they almost certainly havel Rather it is whether (and probably) at what thresholdf the Fed may have to step in to rein in run0-away hawks. - To be fair, the fervour surrounding the 'Dot Plot' that now prices in two rate hikes in 2023 (from none in March) was not completely unexpected by the Fed. Afterall, Fed Chair Jerome Powell took pains to advise taking the 'Dot Plot' 'with a pinch of salt'. Markets clearly need more seasoning! - Meanwhile, a spirited buying of USD (more precisely covering USD shorts) alongside an unravelling of reflation trades has left a pool of blood in FX markets and shaken down equities. - Long-end bond yields are down presumably on the belief that hawks will tame inflation, while 2Y yields are up as markets or risk appetite as liquidity driven buoyancy is being questioned. - To be clark the Fed's primary remit is not to prevent volatility in emerging markets. - But a continued decline in asset markets and contagion risks between equilies and commodities as reflation trades unvil will not be ignored. Specifically a tightening of overall financial conditions - which is Fed

trades unwind will not be ignored. Specifically a tightening of overall financial conditions - which is Fed speak for equity/credit market sell-off - could jolt Fed into dovish gear.

npts to rein in run-

speak for equity/credit market sell-off - could joil + ed into dovish gear. - For now, the Fed will probably gauge how far hawkish interpretations of the 'Dot Plot' will run. - But if markets fall into old habits of over-indulgence (as they are prone to), then Fed attempts to rein in run away hawks down the road should not surprise anyone. - Which is to say, USD bulls may want to exercise some restraint along the way. The same restraint that BoT and BSP will require in holding back additional easing even as COVID impact lingers.

Malaysia's 'National Recovery Plan': Cautious, Contingent & Challenging! - On 15 June, 15 days into a complete nationwide lockdown, PM Muhyuddin Yassin outlined a four

On 15 June, 15 days into a complete nationwide lockdown, PM Muhyuddin Yassin outlined a four phase National Recovery Plan' (NRC).
 The recovery is based on three main indicators: the average daily infection rate, ICU bed capacity and the percentage of the population completely vaccinated. The government wants to move into *phase* 4 after October this year, with 60% of the population vaccinated.
 As we discussed earlier, Malaysia' vaccination procurement plans are in place to receive adequate supplies to meet their vaccination goals for the year (see *Minuho Insights: 27 April 2021: ASEAN-6 and India: Renewed*

 Virus Outbreaks Threaten Crowth Recovery Amidst Slow Inoculations).

 - That said, some delays are inevitable given high global demand for vaccine doses.

 - Notwithstanding, mobilising the population to get vaccinated and adhering to social restrictions will remain challenging; yet critical in hitting prowth in Q 2 and Q3 will be impacted by the tighter social restrictions. There could be some spillover into Q4 as well, especially if the timeline to enter Phase-4 is delayed. We expect 2021 GDP growth to come in at 4.7%, with the risks titled to the downside.

 - While Bank Negara Malaysia has some room to maneouver in terms of cutting the policy rate (although not our base case), and providing additional creditifuiduidity support (our base case), its flexibility will diminish as the US Fed signals a clear intent to tighten monetary policy.

 - Fiscal policy still has some legs to support growth and the self-imposed debt ceiling could be raised again, if nee deb. But increasingly high debt levels will add to the financing burden and borrow from future growth as the economy locks to weave itself out of the pandemic.

	daily		% of population		
	infections	ICU bed	fully	Expected	
Phase	rate	capacity			Other comments
				The	The current daily average case count
				country is	is above 5,000 and although the pace
				currently in	of vaccinations is picking up, progress
Phase 1	>4000	Full capacity	4.6%	Phase-1	remains slow.
					Under Phase-2, movement controls
					will still be tight but economic
					activities can be reopened in stages
					subject to 80% workforce on site.
		Not at a			Interstate travel and social activities
Phase 2	<4000	critical stage	10%	July	are still banned
					Under Phase Three, all economic
					sectors (other than those on the high-
					risk list) will be reopened at workforce
		ICU bed			capacity of 80%. High-risk economic
		capacity			activities are considered to be close-
		reduced;			contact and crowded spaces. Sports
		healthcare			and education related social activities
		system is		End-	will be eased. Parliament could
Phase 3	<2000	"comfortable"	40%	August	reconvene (September or October).
					In this final phase, all economic
					sectors will be fully reopened, while
		No stress on	1		social activities, interstate travel and
		the healthcare		After	domestic tourism will be allowed unde
Phase 4	<500	system Malav mail. Mizu	60%	October	tight standard operating procedures.

rous provinces and cities across the country forcing authorities to rele it way to r impose tighter social restrictions

- At last count, 39 provinces and cities had been impacted by the latest wave of infections Of these, crucial provinces such Bac Ninh, howe to Samsung and Apple suppliers in Vietnam, have become virus hotspots with the factories itself being the epicenters of the outbreaks, forcing

closures of four industrial parks. The bigger cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh have not been spared either as tighter social

restrictions forced street vendors, some forms of public transport and some retail outlets to close. - Second, Vietnam is lagging badly in vaccinations, in both procurement and progress. - The latest data shows that only 0.07% of the population has been fully vaccinated while around the second street vendors. 1.8% of the population has recieved one dose.

After initially relying solely on AstraZeneca vaccines, the government has diversified vaccine sources

 After initially felying solely on Astrazeneca vaccines, the government has diversified vaccines sources to include China's Sinofarm and Russia's Sputhik, and the government is also in talks to acquire Pizer and Moderna vaccine doses but these have not been formally endorsed yet.
 According to Vietnam's Health Ministry, the country will obtain 125mn doses of vaccines this year, which will be able to vaccine 64% of the population. But these are still subject to delays and also fall short of the government goal to obtain 150mn, i.e. for 75% of the population. This underscores ongoing efforts to build on its vaccine pipeline to attain higher vaccination rates

Inevitably, the interim impact to growth will be noticeable.
 Industrial production and retail sales slowed in May from April despite broadly favourable base effects

and will likely slow further in June given the recent wave of infections continues to intensify. Officials are acknowledging this hit to growth. The Ministry of Planning and Invest
 GDP growth forecast to 5.8% from 6.2% in Jan; implying 7.1% growth (Q1: 4.5%). nt cut H1 - From a policy perspective, both the government and central bank remain in a strong position to

provide further support to growth if needed. - The government ran a budget surplus for the year until April 2021 while the central bank has some

Bank Sentral ng Pilipinas: Still hamstrung by high inflation

- Although headline inflation has remained stable at 4.5% YoY for the 3 months since March 2021, it Although headline inflation has remained statile at 4.5% FOT for the ormonate since matter 2011, and remains elevated and above the the BSP's 2-4% headline inflation target range.
 This will no doubt constrain BSP's ability to cut the policy rate even as a sharp resurgence in the since and interest and interest.

COVID-19 infections forced the authorities to institute more stringent lockdowns and tighter social restrictions in many parts of the country since April.
- The slow vaccination drive is not helping either as the country still struggles to obtain enough

vaccination doses to allow the population to reach 'herd immunity'.

That said, BSP still has other non-rate tools in its monetary policy kit which it can use as it deems fit. This includes another 200bp in Reserve Requirement Ratio cuts and additional credit/liquidity support measures for banks and households.

- In all this, it is worth nothing that USD/PHP has been relatively resilient. The Balance of Payments position shifted to a large suplus in April following three consecutive months of deficit. Moreover, BSP has continued to build FX reserves to buffer against shocks to the currency.

With the US Federal Reserve expected to raise rates sooner-than-previously forecasted, some depreciation pressures on the PHP may start to build. - Unfortunately for BSP, this could also coincide with a decelerating inflation profile once again putting

the central bank in the midst of conflicting outcomes, which could constrain policy space Bank of Thailand: Status Quo

BOT will keep its policy rate unchanged at historical low of 0.50%; with no motivation for the BOT to make any major to its policy as it continues to defer pandemic support to fiscal policy.
 Although BOT lowered its 2021 GDP growth forecast in May to 2% for this year from 3%

previously, it will likely formalise this downgrade at its June meeting when it also releases a quarterly update coinciding with its June meeting.

Even with this downgrade, the risks to the growth outlook are titled to the downside.
 For one, the government is missing its vaccination targets on account of a shortfall in vaccine

supplies. And regardless of intent to, acquiring more vaccine will take time.
- Second, it will take even longer for the tourism sector to kick start as not only do vaccinations

domestically need to speed up, but also globally. - Even with the US Federal Reserve sounding a tad more hawkish at the margin, the BOT will remain comfortable holding onto its firmly dovish bias on account of the rather dismal state of recovery in key sectors of the economy; especially as subdued inflation buys policy space.

21-Jun-2021

#### Forex Rate

	Close*	Chg^	% Chg^	W	eek For	ecast
USD/JPY	110.21	0.550	0.50%	108.80	~	111.80
EUR/USD	1.1864	-0.0245	-2.02%	1.170	~	1.205
USD/SGD	1.3451	0.019	1.44%	1.3300	~	1.3540
USD/THB	31.489	0.402	1.29%	31.30	~	32.00
USD/MYR	4.1395	0.031	0.75%	4.122	~	4.175
USD/IDR	14375	186	1.31%	14,200	~	14,650
JPY/SGD	1.2202	0.011	0.93%	1.190	~	1.244
AUD/USD	0.7479	-0.023	-2.97%	0.742	~	0.773
USD/INR	73.86	0.785	1.07%	73.2	~	74.8
USD/PHP	48.433	0.732	1.53%	48.2	~	49.0

# ^ Changes are on weekly basis

FX Theme: Of Bulls & Hawks
- The post-FOMC USD upswing was not entirely unexpected given overdone USD sell-off heading into
the FOMC (especially amid hot inflation data and sustained economic recovery)

But how severe and sustained USD resurgence may be at this point appears to be dependent on and driven by the conviction behind;

i) rising short-end yields moved by the "Dot Plot", and; ii) higher real yields provoked by the Fed's inflation-fighting chops

ii) higher real yields provoked by the Fed's inflation-fighting chops
 And the latter (higher real yields) is specifically being inspired by the assumption that a Fed moving considerably sooner than earlier flagged will rein in inflation expectations (hence falling breakeven).
 In other words, the current USD bulls are driven by FONC hawks.
 Which is to say, any clarification that dials back and/or qualifies the projected hawkishness of the Fed may very well lead to some reversal of the recent bout of USD strength.
 At the very least, check sharp USD surges that have been sustained since the FONC.
 As such, a more cautious approach to one-way long USD bets - especially as USD short squeeze peters out and deliberate long USD positions are required to extend Greenback strength.
 What's more, exaggerated drop in commodity currencies due to the sharp unwind in reflation be may also be due for soul-searching in coming sessions/weeks as the underlying intent of the Fed to reflate the economy is merely calibrated not cast out.
 The upshot is that USD bulls are unlikely to remain on an unbridled rampage as the Fed is likely to check overdone hawkish interpretations of June FOMC.

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- We expect that EUR will be bought back on drops below 1.17, while AUD at 0.74 may look like a bargain Meanwhile, USD/CNH will be watched for any sharp moves above 6.50-6.52.

- To be sure, "taper" risks down the road also align with a stronger USD. But on vav USD

JPY: Coss Currents
- USD/JPY bulls are not as charged up as broad-based USD upwings suggest.
- For one, the unexpected and sudden USD squeeze has led to a meltdown in Cross/JPY;
- which in tim is checking upside in USD/JPY.
- What's more, softer long-end UST yields that have accompanied this bout of USD surge is also leading to
some top-end pressures on USD/JPY; hindering a sustained move aup above 111 at this juncture.
- For now, USD/JPY could thus be traopped in aloftier consolidation in the 109-112 range as USD direction is
stress tested. And knock-back on advance may be par for th course on "risk off".

## EUR: Suppressed

EUR: Suppressed = EUR bears could have further to go on two accounts. - First, the post-FOMC bout of USD strength that is sweeping across FX land; especially amid the entrenching view that the ECB will lag the Fed in terms of normalization. - Second, this EUR lag (owing to ECB defencee) being further emphasized by resurgence of COVID in Europe led by the more transmissible delta variant. - This is also expected to cast a shadow on the EUR. - That said, a lot of the weakness has been baked in since FOMC, and hus EUR drop below 1.18 to 1.17 could potentially induce some reversal given the C/A surplus backing of the single currency. - Near-term range of sub-1.17 to 1.20 is likely to hold most headline triggers.

#### SGD: EUR & CNY Cues to Dominate

 How far broad-based USD strength can extend will determine the range of the USD/SGD in strict sense.
 Point being, SGD moves are not a reflection weak fundamentals and or MAS monetary policy response being priced in. In fact the trade-weighted S\$NEER remains at stronger half of the policy bands.
 Instead broad-based USD strength showing up as weaker trade partner currencies is what is driving SGD weakness at this point

i) CNY cues (how much the PBoC allows itto depreciate from price setting signals) and;
 ii) how far the EUR falls are two key determinants of (USD/)SGD moves that are consisten with a fairly buoyant SSNEER.

- At this juncture, we expect that USD/SGD will be traded 1.33 to low-1.35 as USD retains tone, but perhaps the ferocity of USD gainsis tamed.

## AUD: Tempering Reflation Unwind? - A double whammy of commodity s

my of commodity sell-off and a strong USD may well set course for a sub-0.75 AUD that goes on to test the 0.74 handle

And it certainly doe snot help that hawkish interpretations of the Fed's 'Dot Plot' accentuate the Fed-RBA divergence that feeds into AUD weakness

Specifically a more state-dependenmt Fed compared to the "time-dependent" RBA tah has batted away any till 2024

- That said, we are not betting on a one-way slide in AUD either as unravelling reflation trades are likely to run out of room as would overdone hawkish bets on the Fed. So a consolidation amid low-0.74 to high-0.76 appears par for the course as markets check overdone moves.

#### Bond Yield (%)

18-Jun	2-yr	Chg (bp)^	10-yr	Chg (bp)^	Curve			
USD	0.254	10.7	1.438	-1.4	Flattening			
GER	-0.675	1.7	-0.205	7.0	Steepening			
JPY	-0.131	0.5	0.045	2.2	Steepening			
SGD	0.338	2.6	1.451	8.2	Steepening			
AUD	0.039	4.5	1.589	11.3	Steepening			
GBP	0.120	7.7	0.750	4.4	Flattening			
Stock A	Stock Market							

	Close	% Chg
S&P 500 (US)	4,166.45	-1.91
Nikkei (JP)	28,964.08	0.05
EuroStoxx (EU)	4,083.37	-1.05
FTSE STI (SG)	3,144.16	-0.44
JKSE (ID)	6,007.12	-1.45
PSEI (PH)	6,851.38	-0.82
KLCI (MY)	1,589.05	0.88
SET (TH)	1,612.98	-1.44
SENSEX (IN)	52,344.45	-0.25
ASX (AU)	7,368.85	0.77

US Treasuries: Overdone UST Yield Curve Flattening? - Headines suggest that last week's FOMC was a hawkish surprise. And this is true insofar that the "Dot Plot" suggested two rate hikes being baked into 2023 (from none previoulsy). - What is however less clear is why this would trigger a flattening of the UST yield curve, which


that entails softer long-end and higher short-end yields. At face value, the rise in 2Y yields being attributed to rate hikes being factored in as a response to a more "hawkish" "Dot Plot" for 2023 is perhaps not odd per se.


But the softening in long-end yields requires some reconciliation given current experience of cost-push pressures that may be set to grow.
 In particular if the Fed is going to transition into normalization with "taper" as the first port of (a) a set of the set o


call (and with appreciable lead over rate hikes)


- Point being, "taper" as we know it from 2013 usually leads with UST yield curve steepening (driven by rising long-end yields) at least in the early stages before flipping to UST curve flattening (left by rising 2Y yields) as rate hikes come into view.

Cuestion is whether the flatter yield curve has gotten too far ahead of "taper" and rising 2Y yields out of sync with the Fed's intent. If so, current flattening may subside. 2Y yield upside looking capped around 0.3%, while 10Y sub-1.4% dips may be rendered unsustainable.









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